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Plain Language in Pennsylvania: Fading
Issue or Development on the Horizon?
Sir, the law is as I say it is, and so it has been laid down ever
since the law began; and we have several set forms which are
held as law, and so held and used for good reason, though we
cannot at present remember that reason.
Fortescue, C.J.1
Languages grow and adapt as much as the human beings who
speak them. A constant characteristic of language is change. The
English language has steadily advanced from its Anglo-Saxon origins
to the version which Americans speak today, and it continues to
evolve in order to meet the needs of modern society.
One area in which growth of the English language has slack-
ened is the language of law. Lawyers seek certainty and precision.
Once they develop fit and proven means of expression in terms which
have become well defined over time, they are reluctant to abandon
them. Consequently, the language of the law has remained stagnant
while the general body of English language has matured, and a gulf
has developed between the language of lawyers and the language of
laymen. One result of this chasm is that ordinary consumers, who
lack expertise needed to interpret "legalese," find the language of
legal documents foreign.
Plain language laws address this problem.2 They attempt to
simplify consumer contracts and make them as understandable as
possible to consumers.3 Drafting a plain language law and getting a
state legislature to approve it, however, are not simple tasks. Politi-
cal and pragmatic hurdles abound.
1. Y.B. 36 Hen. VI, ft. 25b-26 (1458); transl., 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW 626 (3d ed. 1923).
2. For a compilation of plain language literature published between 1963 and 1983,
see Hathaway, Bibliography of Plain English for Lawyers, 62 MICH. B.J. 989 (1983). Most of
this issue is devoted to the plain language debate in Michigan. For examples of contracts
written in plain language, see generally J. JOSEPH & J. HILLER, LEGAL AGREEMENTS IN PLAIN
ENGLISH (1982). For a manual on how to draft documents in plain English, see generally
AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, GUIDELINES FOR DOCUMENT DESIGNERS.
3. The aim of plain language laws depends on each situation. Making every contract
perfectly clear to every consumer is impossible. Plain language laws do not, therefore, attempt
to eliminate ambiguity from consumer contracts entirely, but they do try to enhance clarity.
Pennsylvania's experience with plain language legislation exem-
plifies the difficulties entailed. The Pennsylvania Legislature strug-
gled long and fought hard over the Plain Language Consumer Con-
tract Act.4 Lobbying groups from a variety of factions pressured the
Legislature for so many changes that the proposal ultimately became
amorphous. The bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee at
the end of the 1983-84 legislative session,5 but its supporters are al-
ready kindling a revised version of the Act.' When a new legislative
session convenes in 1985, it must decide whether to begin the plain
language crusade anew.
This comment will examine the merits of reintroducing plain
language legislation in Pennsylvania. Section I will explore plain lan-
guage laws generically and will analyze what other states have done.
Section II will trace the legislative and political history of Pennsylva-
nia's Plain Language Consumer Contract Act. Section III will ad-
dress the arguments for and against passage of a plain language law
in Pennsylvania. Finally, Sections IV and V will offer suggestions on
drafting a plain language bill for Pennsylvania which would be both
feasible and politically palatable.
I. Plain Language Laws in the Abstract and in Practice
The term "plain language law" is a misnomer. It names this
type of legislation by its principal medium rather than its purpose.
The goal of plain language laws is to make consumer contracts as
comprehensible as possible. Since plain language is merely a means
to that end, "clear contract laws" would perhaps be a more appropri-
ate title.
7
Proponents of plain language laws claim that consumer con-
tracts are written for lawyers, not consumers. 8 They maintain that
drafters of consumer contracts concern themselves only with protect-
ing their clients and fail to consider consumers' ability to understand
legal documents.9 Complicating this situation is that many consumer
contracts are standard form contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. The superior bargaining position of creditors furnishes them
4. H.R. 538, 167th Gen. Assembly, 1983-84 Sess. (Printer's Nos. 605, 1806, 2674,
2740, and 3157).
5. Telephone interview with Virginia Snyder, History Room, Pennsylvania House of
Representatives (Jan. 16, 1985).
6. Interview with Representative Allen Kukovich, prime sponsor of the Plain Lan-
guage Consumer Contract Act (Aug. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Kukovich interview].
7. Out of deference to common usage and for the sake of consistency, this comment
will continue to use the term "plain language law(s)."
8. The Pittsburgh Press, June 3, 1984, at B8 (statements of Atty. Jeff Friedman, who
assisted Rep. Kukovich in drafting the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act) [hereinafter
cited as Pittsburgh Press].
9. C. FELSENFELD & A. SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 26 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as WRITING CONTRACTS].
with "a frightening degree of license."' 0 Moreover, a consumer's
needs cannot always wait; necessity may force him to bind himself
under a contract containing impenetrable language. When a con-
sumer signs a contract which he is unable to interpret, the basic con-
tractual element of mutual understanding is missing."
Plain language laws do not attempt to reverse or even equalize
bargaining positions of creditors and consumers, but they do try to
illuminate the disparity.' 2 They make no substantive revisions in con-
tract law; rather, they address the imbalance in bargaining position
by making contracts more comprehensible to consumers.' 3 Plain lan-
guage laws are premised on the theory that the more consumers un-
derstand contracts, the more they are able to guard against unfair
terms and make reasoned decisions.
Plain language laws have an impact upon the market place.
They eliminate concealed contract provisions and provide new areas
of competition for creditors.' 4 The plain language movement has also
encouraged creditors to offer more than goods and services to their
customers. As a result of the plain language movement, many busi-
nesses have begun to view their contracts as related to their
products.'"
A. History of the Plain Language Movement Outside Pennsylvania
The private business sector provided the impetus for the plain
language movement. In 1975, Citibank of New York embarked upon
an experiment to simplify its consumer loan forms.16 Citibank re-
vised its consumer loan note by reorganizing the sequence of ideas,
eliminating "boiler plate" provisions, using personal pronouns to re-
fer to the parties, simplifying language, eliminating unnecessary
technical terms and explaining those which had to be retained, short-
ening sentences, utilizing contractions, employing verb forms when
possible, dividing the text into a series of subsections with headlines,
and increasing type size to make the document more visually
appealing.
17
Citibank's action prompted Assemblyman Peter Sullivan to in-
10. id. at 34.
11. Ross, On Legalities and Linguistics: Plain Language Legislation, 30 BUFFALO L.
REV. 317, 354 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Legalities and Linguistics].
12. Ferry & Teitelman, Plain Language Laws: Giving the Consumer an Even Break,
14 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 522, 522 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Plain Language Laws].
13. Id.
14. See WRITING CONTRACTS, supra note 9, at 239.
15. Id.
16. See Millus, Plain Language Laws: Are They Working?, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 147 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Are They Working].
17. See WRITING CONTRACTS supra note 9, at 28.
troduce a plain language bill in the New York Legislature."8 The
proposal passed in 1977 with little opposition.' 9 When the Sullivan
Act went into effect in 1978, it became the first plain language con-
sumer contract statute in the country.20 A flurry of plain language
activity followed in other state legislatures. Over thirty states consid-
ered plain language consumer contract proposals.
21 Connecticut, 22
Maine,23 New Jersey, 24 Hawaii,
25 Minnesota, 26 and West Virginia
27
adopted plain language laws between 1979 and 1981.
But enthusiasm among state legislatures for the plain language
movement has dwindled. No state has enacted a plain language stat-
ute since 1981. By August 1983, only Michigan and Pennsylvania
were considering plain language proposals for consumer contracts.28
Mirroring the fate of Pennsylvania's Act, Michigan's plain language
consumer contract bill died when the Michigan Legislature failed to
pass it by the end of 1984.29
B. Scope of Coverage
When a plain language bill is in its drafting stages, one of the
most important considerations is its scope. The potential for opposi-
tion steadily increases as the bill's scope broadens.
There are two ways to limit coverage of plain language laws.
One method is to establish a monetary maximum.30 Any consumer
contract which involves an amount in excess of the monetary ceiling,
excluding interest and finance charges, is not subject to plain lan-
guage requirements. The other method is to limit the types of docu-
ments subject to plain language laws.3" These laws frequently cover
contracts for buying goods on time (particularly automobiles and
household appliances), borrowing money, leasing goods and housing
facilities, and buying insurance.32
In practice, plain language statutes usually use both monetary
18. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 318.
19. Id.
20. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
21. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 320.
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-151 to 158 (West Supp. 1984).
23. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1121-1126 (1980 & Supp. 1984-1985).
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-1 to 13 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
25. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 487A-1-487A-4 (Supp. 1983).
26. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325G.29-.37 (West 1981 & West Supp. 1984).
27. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109 (Supp 1984).
28. 32 SIMPLY STATED 4 (1983) (monthly newsletter of the Document Design Center,
American Institutes for Research, 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20007).
29. Telephone interviews with Sheila Faunce, Aide to Consumer Affairs Committee,
Michigan House of Representatives (Sept. 26, 1984 and Jan. 16, 1985).
30. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 320.
31. Id.
32. See Plain Language Laws, supra note 12, at 523.
maximum and type of document limitations. The laws may specifi-
cally exclude certain documents, such as mortgages, deeds, and se-
curities transactions. Such exclusions probably stem from a need for
traditional, arcane language in these documents and from a realiza-
tion that these transactions typically do not involve unwary consum-
ers without legal counsel.3"
Monetary ceilings in states which have plain language laws
range upwards from $25,000.00. The ceilings are as follows: New
York, $50,000.00;"' Connecticut, $25,000.00;"5  Maine,
$100,000.00;36 New Jersey, $50,000.00, with no limit on contracts
for real estate or insurance; 37 Hawaii, $25,000.00;38 and Minnesota,
$50,000.00. 31 West Virginia has no monetary maximum.
Plain language laws apply only to consumer contracts. They do
not cover government contracts, business contracts, commercial con-
tracts, and all other contracts to which a consumer is not a party.
Plain language statutes universally stipulate that the subject matter
of a consumer contract must be used primarily for personal, family
or household concerns.40 Several states further restrict coverage of
their plain language laws by explicitly exempting a number of ordi-
nary consumer transactions." Although consumer contracts re-
present only a narrow range of contract law, the potential impact of
plain language legislation is still considerable because of the sheer
volume of transactions affected. 2
33. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 321. For a discussion recognizing
the difficult nature of these transactions but nevertheless maintaining that plain language rules
should apply, see Are They Working, supra note 16, at 154.
34. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-151 (West Supp. 1984).
36. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1123 (1980).
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-9 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
38. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1983).
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.30 (West 1981 & West Supp. 1984).
40. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-151 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1122 (1980); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:12-1 (West Supp. 1984-1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1983);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.30 (West 1981 & West Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109
(Supp 1984).
41. Connecticut explicitly exempts mortgages, deeds of real estate, insurance policies,
documents relating to securities transactions, and legal descriptions of property. SEE CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-153, 155 (West Supp. 1984). New Jersey excludes certain securities
and commodities transactions; its law does not cover securities transactions with brokers regis-
tered with the Securities Exchange Commission or commodities transactions with merchants
registered with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-1
(West Supp. 1984-1985). Hawaii excuses wills, trusts, legal descriptions of real property, and
insurance contracts. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 487A-1, A-4 (Supp. 1983).
42. New York limits the scope of its law by requiring plain English only in residential
leases and consumer contracts for money, property or services. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Connecticut covers consumer loans, leases of personal
property or services, and leases of residential dwellings. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-151
(West Supp. 1984). Maine's plain language requirements apply only to consumer loans. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1123 (1980). New Jersey's version embraces situations in
which consumers lease real or personal property, obtain credit or insurance, borrow money,
C. Requirements
In general, the easier it is to satisfy plain language require-
ments, the less they protect consumers. Conversely, the more difficult
it is to comply with such requirements, the more they burden credi-
tors and stimulate opposition.
Plain language laws attempt to clarify consumer contracts by
addressing three considerations.43 One is legibility, consumers' abil-
ity to see print on a piece of paper. Another is semantic clarity, the
ease with which consumers can understand words in a contract. The
third is coherence, the manner in which various parts of a document
relate to each other.
One effect of the plain language movement has been to elevate
the importance of document design. Elements once thought of as
pure aesthetics have taken a consequential place in contract law; the
printing of contracts has become too important to leave to printers."'
Legibility requirements tend to be objective, and compliance is
usually easy to measure. Factors affecting visual appearance of con-
sumer contracts which may be subject to regulation include: page
layout, type character (type face), type size, use of capital letters,
leading (the space between the lines), line length, margins, color of
ink and paper, text arrangement, and headings.45
Three of the seven plain language states have adopted legibility
requirements. Connecticut has both subjective and objective legibil-
ity requirements, and compliance with either set of standards satis-
fies the statute.46 Connecticut's subjective legibility provisions call
for readable size type, ink which contrasts with the paper, section
headings and other subdivisions with boldface captions, and layout
and spacing which separate paragraphs, sections, and borders."
Connecticut's objective legibility standards require type face of no
less than eight points, a three-sixteenths inch space between
paragraphs, a one-half inch border around each page, and section
captions in twelve-point boldface type.48 By contrast, New Jersey
purchase real or personal property, or contract for services. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-1
(West Supp. 1984-1985. Hawaii covers the same items as New York, with the exception that
Hawaii does not require plain English in leases that exceed five years in duration. See HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1983). Minnesota requires plain language in contracts for ser-
vices or personal property, transfers or authorizations of a security interest on personal prop-
erty, and residential leases for a term no longer than three years. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
325G.30 (West 1981 & West Supp. 1984). West Virginia's plain language law applies to
residential leases and sales of goods or services. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109 (Supp. 1984).
43. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note I1, at 329.
44. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 183.
45. Id. at 184.
46. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (West Supp. 1984).
47. Id.
48. Id. Captions of typed contracts should be underlined.
furnishes legibility "guidelines" 4 which call for a table of contents,
an alphabetical index for contracts with more than 30,000 words,
and ten-point type for all conditions and promises. In addition, all
collateral promises and conditions must be as prominent as the main
promise. 50 All seven plain language states demand that drafters logi-
cally divide consumer contracts and caption them by section.5
Unlike legibility standards, semantic clarity and coherence re-
quirements do not readily lend themselves to objective, verifiable
rules. As a result, most of the debate over plain language require-
ments has focused on nonvisual considerations. Two contrary stan-
dards have emerged. 52 One is the "clear and coherent" approach.
The Sullivan Act of New York, for example, states that consumer
contracts must be "written in a clear and coherent manner using
words with common and every day meanings." 53 Each state which
enacted a plain language statute after New York had ratified the
Sullivan Act also adopted the "clear and coherent" standard or a
variant thereof.
54
The "clear and coherent" approach is a subjective, descriptive,
verbal standard. It is a concession to the difficulties involved in draft-
ing intricate rules. Instead of mandating specific words and phrases
which drafters of consumer contracts must use, the "clear and coher-
ent" approach merely provides guidance. It opts for generality over
particularity and flexibility over rigidity.
Nonvisual requirements of a plain language statute can also be
based upon objective standards. Such objective standards usually
center on one of a number of readability formulas. Rudolf Flesch
developed the most famous and widely-used readability formula. The
"Flesch Test" determines the comprehensibility of a writing on the
basis of word and sentence length. 55 To apply the test, a reader must
count the number of syllables, words, and sentences in a document. 5
49. The Attorney General and the Commissioner of Insurance must use the guidelines
during their review of consumer contracts, a process which will be discussed later in this sec-
tion. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
50. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:12-10 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
51. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 [[ 1124 (1980 &
Supp. 1984-1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:12-10 (West Supp. 1984-1985); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 487A-I (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. 325G.31 (West 1981); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109
(Supp. 1984).
52. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 215.
53. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1124 (1980 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.J. STAT. AN.. 56:12-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 487A-7 (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.31 (West 1981); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6-109 (Supp. 1984).
55. See Plain Language Laws, supra note 12, at 523-24.
56. Periodic random samplings of approximately 100 words can be used to determine
the readability of longer documents.
He must then determine the average number of syllables per word
and the average number of words per sentence. A readability score
between zero and one hundred is obtained by applying a mathemati-
cal formula 57 to the average word and sentence lengths. 8 The higher
the score is, the more readable is the passage.5 9 A score of at least
60, which is equivalent to 20 words per sentence and 1 1/2 syllables
per word, signifies that the document is written in plain English.
60
So far, Connecticut is the only state to implement a readability
formula.61 Like its visual requirements, Connecticut's nonvisual stan-
dards are divided into subjective and objective groups, and compli-
ance with either set of rules satisfies the statute. The objective,
nonvisual standards mandate an average word length of fewer than
1.55 syllables, an average sentence length of fewer than 22 words,
and an average paragraph length of fewer than 75 words. No sen-
tence in the contract may exceed 50 words, and no paragraph may
surpass 150 words. Connecticut's plain language statute also con-
tains elaborate rules governing the counting process.6 2
Plain language laws designed specifically for the insurance in-
dustry likewise use readability formulas. In contrast to the dearth of
general plain language legislation, nearly half of the states have en-
acted some type of plain language insurance law,6 3 and a majority of
these laws implement the Flesch readability formula. 4 In fact, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners drafted a Model
Life and Health Insurance Policy Language Simplification Act
which requires policies to achieve a minimum Flesch Test score of
40.65
Whether a plain language statute utilizes an objective standard,
a subjective standard, or both, it may also contain a list of prohibited
or encouraged drafting techniques. For example, New Jersey's stat-
ute counsels against confusing cross references; lengthy sentences;
sentences containing double negatives and exceptions to exceptions;
sentences or sections with an illogical or confusing order; words with
57. The averge sentence length is multiplied by 1.015, and the average word length is
multiplied by 84.6. The two products are added, and the sum is subtracted from 206.835.
58. R. FLESCH, HOW TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH 20-25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as R.
FLESCH].
59. Id. at 24-25.
60. Id. at 24.
61. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (West Supp. 1984).
62. Id. § 42-158.
63. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note II, at 320. Connecticut, Maine, and
New Jersey have separate insurance statutes in addition to their plain language laws. Id.
64. See Are They Working, supra note 16, at 156. Typically, insurance statutes provide
for a Flesch Test score of not less than 40 but add that if a policy is understandable in the
judgment of the insurance commissioner, the score is not determinative, suggesting that legis-
lators have some doubts about the Flesch readability formula.
65. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 276.
obsolete or unusual meanings; and Old English, Middle English,
Latin, and French terms."6
D. Remedies
A plain language statute is meaningless without effective reme-
dies for noncompliance.67 Potential remedies include: statutory dam-
ages, attorneys' fees and court costs, class actions, state action, pri-
vate injunctive relief, contract revision, and small claims court
jurisdiction. 8
Statutory damages are punitive and are awarded to claimants in
addition to actual damages. New York, 9 New Jersey,7 0 and Ha-
waii 71 provide for statutory damages of $50.00. Connecticut sanc-
tions statutory damages of $100.00.72
Availability of attorneys' fees encourages both consumers and
their lawyers to take legal action when faced with possible plain lan-
guage infringements. For a consumer, the ability to recover attor-
neys' fees may make it affordable to initiate a law suit. For a lawyer,
availability of attorneys' fees may influence his willingness to re-
present consumers. From a broader perspective, availability of attor-
neys' fees may determine whether consumers as a class are ade-
quately represented by the legal profession."
Three states authorize recovery of attorneys' fees in plain lan-
guage lawsuits. Connecticut limits such awards to $100.00. 74 New
Jersey permits recovery of attorneys' fees up to $2,500.00 in class
actions.7 5 Minnesota provides for attorneys' fees if the creditor is un-
able to prove he acted in good faith and limits recovery to
$10,000.00 in class actions.
7
New York,77 New Jersey,78 Hawaii,7 9 and Minnesota 0 explic-
itly permit class actions. Each of these states limits the penalties
which courts can impose on creditors to $10,000.00, but none places
any ceiling on actual damages recoverable. Connecticut specifies that
plain language violations do not subject creditors to class action
66. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-10 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
67. See Plain Language Laws, supra note 12, at 524.
68. Id. at 524-25.
69. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
70. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-3 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
71. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1983).
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-154 (West Supp. 1984).
73. Rodriguez, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Consumer Contract Actions in Connect-
icut, I U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 55 (1980).
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-154 (West Supp. 1984).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-3, 12-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.34 (West 1981).
77. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
79. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1983).
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.34 (West 1981).
liability.8"
Enforcement of the plain language requirements through state
action is another alternative. New York,"2 New Jersey,83 Hawaii, 84
Maine, 85 and Minnesota8" provide for some type of enforcement by
state officials. New Jersey and Minnesota established review
processes through which creditors can submit consumer contracts to
the state attorney general or insurance commissioner for approval. If
the Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner determines that a
contract complies with his state's plain language standards, his certi-
fication protects the creditor from liability under his state's plain
language law. Each state charges a review fee of $50.00 to creditors
using the service.
Maine also provides for a review process. Under its plain lan-
guage law, creditors can submit consumer loan forms to the Bureau
of Consumer Protection for approval. Once the Bureau certifies a
document, legal action based on plain language violations is barred.
If the Bureau fails to act within forty-five days, the document is
deemed certified. The Sullivan Act authorizes New York's Attorney
General to seek injunctive relief and administrative costs from viola-
tors. In Hawaii, either the Attorney General or the Director of the
Office of Consumer Protection may bring an action to restrain or
prevent any plain language transgression.
Another consideration with regard to enforcement is the effect
that violations of plain language rules will have on the validity of
consumer contracts. Plain language proponents argue that an un-
readable contract should be void because mutual understanding be-
tween the parties is impossible.87 Plain language laws, however, usu-
ally avoid dismantling contractual obligations.88 Only New Jersey
grants private individuals a right to seek injunctions against credi-
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-155 (West Supp. 1984).
82. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-8, -8.2, and -12 (West Supp. 1984-1985). New Jersey
permits its Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner, or "any interested person" to seek
injunctive relief. Id.
84. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-3 (Supp. 1983).
85. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1126 (1980 & Supp. 1984-1985).
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.35 (West Supp. 1984).
87. See Plain Language, supra note 12, at 525. New York, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Hawaii, Minnesota and West Virginia stipulate that a violation of plain language requirements
does not render a consumer contract void or voidable and that a violation is no defense for a
consumer in an action brought by a creditor. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney
Supp. 1984-1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-157 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:12-11 (West Supp. 1984-1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-2 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325G.34 (West 1981); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109 (Supp. 1984). New Jersey and
Minnesota authorize courts to reform or limit provisions in consumer contracts under certain
circumstances in order to avoid unfair results. Both states caution that consumers suing for
plain language violations are not entitled to withhold performance of a contract. See N.J. §
56:12-4.1; MINN. § 325G.33.
88. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 325-26.
tors. 89 No state specifically addresses the question of small claims
court jurisdiction.
E. Defenses, Exempted Language, and Prohibitions
Plain language laws may enumerate defenses, exempted lan-
guage, and prohibitions. Possible defenses include showing that: the
consumer was represented by counsel when he entered the contract;
the consumer prepared the contract;90 the consumer understood the
contract when he entered into it; the creditor made a good faith at-
tempt at compliance with the plain language law; and all parties
fully performed their contractual obligations.9' Language exempted
from plain language requirements may include words, phrases, or
forms which are required by state or federal law, rule, regulation, or
governmental body.92 Technical terms and terms of art may also be
excluded.93 The only potential prohibition which does not address
language usage or visual appearance is a provision which invalidates
any waiver of plain language requirements.94
II. Pennsylvania's Plain Language Consumer Contract Act
Representative Allen Kukovich (Democrat, Westmoreland
County) introduced the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act in
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-12 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
90. Only Connecticut recognizes the defenses that the consumer was represented by
counsel or that the consumer prepared the contract. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-155
(West Supp. 1984).
91. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 325. New York, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Hawaii and Minnesota authorize good faith defenses. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-702 (McKinney 1984-1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-155 (West Supp. 1984);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-5 (West Supp. 1984-1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.34 (West 1981). New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Hawaii provide that full performance of a consumer contract is a defense to plain language
claims. See N.Y. § 5-702; CONN. § 42-155; N.J. § 56:12-5; HAWAII § 487A-1. New Jersey's
decision to shield creditors from liability once a contract is fully performed may put consumers
in a difficult position because New Jersey's plain language law states that initiation of suit does
not entitle consumers to withhold performance. N.J. § 36:12-5.
No state allows the defense that a consumer understood the contract when he entered into
it, probably because of difficulties inherent in proving such a charge.
92. All seven states that enacted plain language laws have exempted any words,
phrases, and forms required by law, regulation, rule or governmental body. See N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-156 (West
Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1123 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-6 (West
Supp. 1984-1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.32
(West 1981); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109 (Supp. 1984).
93. New Jersey and Minnesota provide that technical terms and terms of art do not
violate plain language requirements. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:12-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.32 (West 198 1). Minnesota adds a proviso that exempted technical
terms and terms of art must be customarily used in connection with the services or property
which are the subject of the consumer contract. MINN. § 325G.32.
94. Connecticut, New Jersey, Minnesota and West Virginia hold that any waiver of a
consumer's plain language rights is void. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-157(West Supp.
1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-11 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.36
(West 1981); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109 (Supp. 1984).
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on March 21, 1983." 5
Originally the proposal was broad in scope, contained strict require-
ments, and provided stiff penalties. The bill soon caused an uproar
among bankers, retailers, realtors, and insurers, and a surge of lob-
bying ensued.9 6 Among the groups taking part in the debate were the
Pennsylvania Bankers' Association, the Pennsylvania Retailers' As-
sociation, the Pennsylvania Association of Realtors, the National
Federation of Independent Business, and the Pennsylvania Citizens'
Consumer Council.97 The Pennsylvania Bar Association took no
stand on the plain language issue.98
Opponents of Representative Kukovich's proposal succeeded in
altering its terms. In fact, the Plain Language Consumer Contract
Act underwent a total of over eighty revisions and compromises.99
The House of Representatives formally considered the proposal on
three separate occasions100 and ultimately passed a version which
differed substantially from the original. 01 The Senate made addi-
tional amendments'0 2 before the bill was buried in the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee.
A. The Kukovich Proposal
As originally introduced, the Plain Language Consumer Con-
tract Act covered any situation in which a consumer borrows money;
buys, leases, or rents personal property, real property, or services; or
obtains credit or insurance. It included a standard provision of plain
language legislation requiring that goods or services which are the
subject of the consumer contract be used for personal, family, or
household purposes. The bill excluded property descriptions in deeds
and mortgages; real estate certificates of title and title insurance
contracts; contracts to buy securities; and contracts between "people
who are not acting in the usual course of business. '"13
The Kukovich proposal set forth strict rules governing legibility,
semantic clarity, and coherence. With regard to visual standards, it
required type at least ten-point in size; line length, column width,
margins and spacing between lines and paragraphs which "make the
95. H.R. 538 (1983) (Printer's No. 605).
96. The bill's sponsor claims to have rarely witnessed such intense lobbying in response
to other proposals submitted to the Pennsylvania Legislature. See Kukovich interview, supra
note 6.
97. Id.
98. Telephone interview with spokesperson, Harrisburg Office of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association (Sept. 5, 1984).
99. The Pittsburgh Press, June 3, 1984, at B8 (Statements of Assistant to Representa-
tive Kukovich).
100. See COMMONWEALTH OF PA. LEGIS. J. 525 (Mar. 27, 1984).
101. H.R. 538 (1983) (Printer's No. 2740).
102. Id. (Printer's No. 3157).
103. Id. (Printer's No. 605).
contract easy to read;" sections captioned with twelve-point type or
underlined; and ink which "contrasts sharply" with the paper.1"4
The bill also contained nonvisual requirements, including a sub-
jective rule that all consumer contracts be "easy to read and under-
stand."' 6 Beyond this general exhortation, the bill incorporated
nonvisual standards based on an objective readability formula. This
readability test mandated that each consumer contract as a whole
contain sentences averaging no more than 20 words in length and
words averaging no more than 1.5 syllables. 10 6 The bill made no ref-
erence to length of paragraphs.
The readability formula was in reality a mutant of the Flesch
Test. Like the Flesch Test, the Kukovich proposal attempted to de-
termine readability according to sentence and word length, but the
proposal avoided the complicated mathematical formula of the
Flesch Test; instead, it imposed an average sentence length of 20
words and an average word length of 1.5 syllables. This simplified
formula equates to a Flesch Test score of 60, the level recommended
for plain English by Rudolf Flesch."'0 The original version of the
Plain Language Consumer Contract Act, then, called on drafters to
write consumer contracts with readability levels slightly more diffi-
cult than Seventeen, Reader's Digest, and Sports Illustrated; on a
par with the New York Daily News; and slightly easier than Time
and Newsweek. 0 8
The Kukovich proposal also supplied a detailed list of specific
plain language rules. Under these rules, consumer contracts could
not contain technical terms, Latin words, "archaic English," words
specifically defined in the contract, 10 9 or common words used in a
particular legal sense." 0 The rules compelled drafters to employ sec-
ond person pronouns when referring to consumers and first person
pronouns when referring to creditors, lessors, insurers, or sellers.
They prohibited double negatives; exceptions to exceptions; and ref-
erences to other provisions of the contract, outside documents, or
laws, unless the references clearly describe their substance.
The Kukovich proposal further required that each consumer
contract include a statement in ten-point boldface type within a box
on its front page. This statement would begin with the caption
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The Kukovich proposal did not permit the use of 100-word samples but required
the reader to count every syllable, word, and sentence in a consumer contract.
107. See R. FLESCH, supra note 58, at 24.
108. Id. at 26.
109. The apparent logic behind this rule is that if a word requires definition, it is too
complicated to use in consumer contracts.
110. See HR. 538 (1981) (Printer's No. 605).
"PLEASE READ THIS" printed in 12-point boldface type. 11 The
caption would be followed by highlights of: limitations on claims,
lawsuits, and types of relief or warranties available; waivers or limi-
tations of rights; exclusions; and property which would not be af-
fected if the consumer failed to meet his obligations under the con-
tract. Failure to highlight any of these terms would render the
nonhighlighted provisions void.
The remedies section of the Act provided that a creditor, lessor,
insurer, or seller who failed to comply with the bill's plain language
standards could be liable for actual damages; statutory damages of
$500.00;12 court costs and "reasonable" attorneys' fees; and any eq-
uitable or other relief which a court "thinks necessary and
proper."1 '
The bill enabled the Attorney General and district attorneys
throughout Pennsylvania to enforce its plain language requirements
and authorized them to seek equitable and legal relief, orders to
have consumers' money returned, and statutory damages. In addi-
tion, the bill allowed the Attorney General and district attorneys to
accept written assurance of compliance from any person who may
have already committed or who may be about to commit a violation
of plain language standards. This written assurance would be filed
with a Court of Common Pleas or with the Commonwealth Court.
Once filed, the assurance would have the same force and effect as a
court order.1 4
The Kukovich proposal did not apply to situations in which all
parties had fully performed under a consumer contract or in which
the consumer had drafted the agreement. A good faith defense was
available to creditors, sellers, lessors, and insurers if they could show
that their unintentional violation resulted from clerical error. This
provision is unique; none of the five plain language states which al-
low good faith defenses for violations of plain language requirements
limits those defenses to clerical errors. 5
The Kukovich proposal also diverged significantly from existing
plain language laws by making all sections of consumer contracts
which violated its readability standards1 6 void ' against consumers.
Il1. See id.
112. If the total original amount of a consumer contract was less than $500.00, statutory
damages would equal that total amount. Id. Note that the statutory damages provision in the
Kukovich proposal was $400.00 more than the Connecticut permits, and Connecticut's $100.00
award is the largest among those states that enacted plain language laws and provided for
statutory damages. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-154 (West Supp. 1984).
113. See H.R. 538 (1983) (Printer's No. 605).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Tests for average sentence and syllable length were not to be used in determining
whether a consumer contract is void.
117. The proposal emphasized that contractual provisions which violated plain language
Had the original version of the Plain Language Consumer Contract
Act become law, consumers would have been able to escape contrac-
tual obligations when those obligations, as they appeared in the con-
tract, failed to comply with plain language criteria.
The original version also provided certain protections for poten-
tial defendants. The bill limited liability for plain language violations
by requiring every lawsuit to be initiated within four years from the
date on which the contract was signed. The bill further exempted
language required by any federal or state statute, regulation, or rule.
It declared, however, that all waivers of consumers' plain language
rights are invalid.
Opponents of the bill frequently pointed out that the Kukovich
proposal contained a number of sentences exceeding twenty words, a
host of polysyllabic terms, and an abundance of vague expressions.118
Even Representative Kukovich acknowledged that several linguistic
changes in his proposal were needed "to bring it into conformity
with itself."119
B. The House Version
In the Spring of 1984, the House of Representatives finally
passed the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act. As passed, the
bill was very different from the original version.
The delays and revisions which the bill experienced in the
House were politically motivated. For example, the Kukovich propo-
sal was not assigned to the House Consumer Protection Committee,
which probably would have arranged quick public hearings on the
bill; instead, it went to the House Business and Commerce Commit-
tee, whose chairman, Representative L. Eugene "Snuffy" Smith
(Republican, Jefferson County), has a probusiness reputation among
consumer advocates.
12 0
Almost immediately, the House narrowed the scope of the act.
The revised bill no longer expressly covered insurance contracts; yet,
the House version did not specifically exclude them either. Although
the House had expressly exempted insurance contracts during its ini-
tial consideration of the proposal, the House in its final version de-
leted the insurance exemption, perhaps to ensure death of the Plain
Language Consumer Contract Act in the Senate.' while garnering
requirements would be "void, not just voidable." See H.R. 538 (1983).
118. Telephone interview with Fred Brown, lobbyist for the Pennsylvania Realtors' As-
sociation (Sept. 7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brown interview].
119. Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 26, 1981, at 29 [hereinafter cited as Philadelphia
Inquirer].
120. Id.
121. Muddying Contracts, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 13, 1984, at 6 (Editorial)
[hereinafter cited as Muddying Contractsl.
consumer votes for legislators who supported the move.122
By the time it passed the House, the bill included a monetary
maximum of $20,000.00. The House version also changed the types
of transactions covered by exempting deeds, mortgages, mortgage
bonds and notes, real estate certificates of title, and title insurance
contracts. In contrast, the Kukovich proposal had excluded only
property descriptions contained in some of those documents. The
House made visual guidelines less specific by requiring only that
type size, line length, column width, margins, and spacing "make the
contract easy to read;" that sections be appropriately captioned; and
that ink contrast with the paper.'23
The greatest change occurred in the area of nonvisual require-
ments. The House kept the subjective "easy to read and understand"
rule, but it completely abandoned the objective readability test. 124 It
attempted to compensate for the lack of objective standards by issu-
ing a series of "guidelines." ' 25 These guidelines called for use of
short words, sentences, and paragraphs; use of active verb forms;
avoidance of technical terms, other than "commonly understood le-
gal terms" such as "mortgage" and "warranty;" avoidance of Latin
and "foreign" words and terms with "obsolete meanings;" defining
complex terms in "commonly understood" words; referring to parties
through personal pronouns, shortened names, or the labels "seller"
and "buyer" or "lender" and "borrower;" avoidance of sentences
with more than one condition, unless numbered; and avoidance of
cross references, unless they state the subject to which they refer. 26
The House also made significant alterations in the Act's en-
forcement mechanisms. The House lowered statutory damages avail-
able to individuals to $100.00. It added a provision for statutory
damages in class actions but limited those damages to $10,000.00.
Finally, it eliminated awards of attorneys' fees.
Furthermore, the House revised restrictions on liability. It re-
moved the clerical error limitation from the good faith defense and
substituted a requirement that creditors, sellers, or lessors prove by a
preponderance of evidence that their unintended violations occurred
despite use of reasonable procedures designed to avoid plain lan-
guage violations. The House reduced the time limit for initiating
lawsuits from four years to two years from the date on which the
parties signed the contract. Under the House's revision, a violation of
the Act no longer voided a consumer contract or any part of it, and a
122. See Kukovich interview, supra note 6.




violation could not constitute a defense in an action to enforce a con-
tract. Lastly, the House exempted language recommended by any
federal or state agency, including the Federal National Mortgage
Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the
Government National Mortgage Association.
The House added two new defenses. A creditor could defend an
action on the basis that the consumer had received advice from
counsel before signing the contract. Alternatively, the creditor could
assert that the Attorney General had certified the contract as com-
plying with the Act, for the House set up a procedure under which
creditors, sellers, lessors, or persons who prepare and sell consumer
contract forms could submit consumer contracts to the Attorney
General for review. Under this procedure, the Bureau of Consumer
Protection of the Attorney General's Office, using the plain language
"guidelines" presented in the Act would have 120 days to examine
each document submitted. The Bureau could certify a document, de-
cline to certify it, or decline to issue an opinion if the contract was
the subject of pending plain language litigation or was not covered
by the Act. Failure to submit a contract for review would not consti-
tute lack of good faith or raise a presumption of plain language vio-
lations. Although certification would protect creditors against liabil-
ity under the Act, it would not mean that certified contracts satisfied
other legal requirements. The Act authorized the Attorney General
to charge a "reasonable fee" for the review.11
7
C. Senate Amendments
In general, the Pennsylvania Senate has been unsympathetic to
the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act. The Senate made few
changes to the House version, but it let the bill sit undisturbed in
committee while the legislative session waned.
The few changes which the Senate did make were important.
Apparently unsure of the status of insurance contracts, the Senate
expressly excluded them. It further exempted contracts which are
both used by financial institutions and subject to examination by
state or federal authorities. Finally, the Senate prohibited class ac-
tions and limited the Attorney General's review fee to $100.00.
D. Overview of Pennsylvania's Plain Language Consumer Contract
Act
The Plain Language Consumer Contract Act started out as an
inclusive, specific, and forceful measure. Its history from that point
127. Id. The House version contained no clues indicating what a "reasonable" attorney's
fee might be.
is one of constant bickering and sabotage. By the time of its death,
most of its original provisions had been emasculated. Representative
Kukovich admitted that the original bill "was probably too new. "128
He added, "Most legislators didn't want to go that far."' 2 9
The impact of the original proposal rippled beyond the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature. The original bill covered many creditors. Its strict
requirements and stiff penalties hardened a large number of these
creditors and their representatives against the plain language move-
ment. The Pennsylvania Bankers' Association, for example, felt that
the original bill was over-inclusive and potentially disasterous for
business and economic sectors.' 30 Bankers resented the fact that the
financial community in Pennsylvania played no role in framing the
bill.13'
The lesson from Pennsylvania's first experiment with plain lan-
guage legislation is two-fold. First, it may now be harder than ever
to get a plain language law passed in Pennsylvania because the very
suggestion of such legislation evokes scorn in the minds of many peo-
ple who associate plain language attempts with the Kukovich propo-
sal. Second, legislators cannot draft any future plain language propo-
sal solely from the perspective of consumers but must realistically
attempt to deal with concerns of bankers, retailers, realtors, and in-
surers. In short, Pennsylvania needs a plain language law that satis-
fies both consumers and creditors.
III. Should Pennsylvania Enact a Plain Language Law?
Any discussion of arguments for and against plain language
laws should recognize that support in the abstract for plain language
is easy to find. 32 Nonetheless, difficulties inevitably arise whenever a
concrete plain language proposal is presented.
A. Constitutional Concerns
Opponents of plain language laws challenge the desirability of
such legislation on grounds ranging from constitutionality to practi-
cality. 13 The major constitutional arguments focus upon the first
and fourteenth amendments. In a biting attack on plain language
legislation, William C. Prather, General Counsel of the United
128. The Pittsburgh Press, June 3, 1984, at B8 (Statements of Assistant to Representa-
tive Kukovich).
129. Id.
130. Telephone interview with Louise Rynd, member of the legal staff of the Pennsylva-
nia Bankers' Association (Sept. 4, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Rynd interview].
131. The New York Legislature consulted the New York financial community before
passing the Sullivan Act. Id.
132. See Plain Language Laws, supra note 12, at 527.
133. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 340.
States League of Savings, stressed constitutional problems with these
laws. He set forth an objection under the first amendment by re-
marking, "To abridge the freedom of selecting which words to use to
communicate is to abridge the freedom of speech, which is to
abridge the constitutional rights of any person to speak and to com-
municate the thoughts of his choice in any forum. This, incidentally,
includes the freedom to contract."' a4 He added that legislatures
should not attempt to simplify communication but should leave that
decision to the free choice of individuals. Prather concluded, "If two
parties, or one of the parties to an understanding wants to communi-
cate and couch that communication or that contract of agreement in
the most complex convoluted terms, I believe that as Americans they
have that constitutional right.
135
But Prather's analysis overlooks numerous state and federal
statutes that already dictate the manner in which parties to con-
sumer contracts must communicate. 3 ' The Federal Truth in Lend-
ing Act,13 1 which requires "a meaningful disclosure of the terms of
leases of personal property for personal, family or household pur-
poses, ' 38 is the most commonly cited example.
Adding weight to the freedom of speech objection is the criti-
cism that plain language laws generally are not well tailored to their
objectives. Both existing plain language statutes and the various ver-
sions of Pennsylvania's Plain Language Consumer Contract Act are
over-inclusive. 3 9 Although plain language laws are aimed at abuses
that occur when creditors have superior bargaining positions over
consumers, the laws typically encompass other situations as well.
They impinge on consumer contracts of very small operations, one-
time contracts between individuals not engaged in an ongoing busi-
ness of selling or leasing real or personal property, and contracts re-
lating to luxury items. 4 ° The Kukovich proposal attempted to ad-
dress this problem by excluding "contracts between people who are
not acting in the usual course of business," but the House deleted
that exemption.' 4 '
Opponents of plain language have also mounted a void-for-
vagueness argument under the fourteenth amendment. Plain lan-
134. Prather, In Defense of the People's Use of Three Syllable Words, 39 ALA. LAW.
394, 399 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Prather]. Prather is perhaps the most outspoken and
recognized critic of plain language on the national level.
135. Id.
136. For a compilation of federal laws affecting communication between parties to con-
sumer contracts, see Hathaway, An Overview of the Plain English Movement for Languages,
62 Micn. B.J. 945, 947 (1983).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968).
138. Id. § 1601.
139. See Rynd interview, supra note 130.
140. Id.
141. See H.R. 538 (1983) (Printer's Nos. 605 and 2740).
guage laws are susceptible to such an attack because they tend to
use subjective criteria. The broad dictates of plain language laws are
subject to diverse and conflicting interpretations. Pennsylvania's
Plain Language Consumer Contract Act serves as an example. At
various stages throughout its development, it employed the standards
"easy to read and understand," "archaic English," "commonly un-
derstood" legal terms, and "foreign" words with "obsolete mean-
ings."I" Interpretation of such phrases is necessarily relative. As
Prather pointed out, "What is plain, every day, non-technical, and
mainly, what is clear talk is in the eye of the beholder. It is for the
sayer and for the listener to say."14'
Stiff penalties imposed for violations of plain language laws
have made the vagueness of their terms even more objectionable. In
Pennsylvania creditors were particularly worried about potential
class action liability because it would engender increased legal expo-
sure and encourage attorneys to promote consumers' plain language
lawsuits. 144 Through the combination of vague standards, severe pen-
alties, and class action liability, an inadvertent plain language viola-
tion on a commonly used form contract could force even the most
financially-sound enterprise out of business.
145
Ironically, plain language laws can also hurt consumers by re-
ducing the availability of credit. The increased risks which plain lan-
guage laws impose on creditors will invariably result in increased
costs to consumers.1 46 No matter what type plain language law a
state enacts, all costs, ranging from increased risks for creditors to




The leading practical objection to plain language laws is that
prohibition of technical terms and foreign derivatives would destroy
the precision and certainty which those phrases have acquired over
time. Prather emphasized this point by exclaiming, "Two hundred
years of word-and-term definition by the courts can go down the
drain. For with new, substituted language it would take a deluge of
court litigation and another two hundred years of stare decisis to get
back to where we were. '"14 Default, security, fee simple, landlord
142. Id. (Printer's Nos. 605, 1806, 2674, 2740, and 3157).
143. See Prather, supra note 134 at 397.
144. See Rynd interview, supra note 130.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Telephone interview with Louis Biacchi, lobbyist for the Pennsylvania Retailers'
Association (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Biacchi interview].
148. See Prather, supra note 134, at 396.
and tenant, lessee and lessor, month-to-month tenancy, negotiable
instrument, and principal and surety are just a minute sampling 49 of
common legal language which might have to be replaced.
Critics of plain language legislation also contend that some
technical concepts are just too complicated to convert into simple
expressions. 150 Proponents of the plain language movement refute
this charge by de-emphasizing the importance of "legalese." Rudolf
Flesch boldly challenges the sacrosanctity of legal language. He
commented, "Any kind of legalese can be translated into plain En-
glish . . . . The superiority of 'clear, unambiguous' legal language is
sheer myth and . . . virtually all traditional legalisms are
unnecessary." 1 51
An apparently viable middle-ground is to retain technical terms
in consumer contracts but to briefly explain them in simple En-
glish. "'52 Critics counter that this approach actually makes consumer
contracts more difficult to understand. A paradox of plain language
laws is that they require additional verbiage to replace or explain
technical phrases. Clusters of new words are needed to supplant
terms like "collateral," "pledge," "finance charges," and "secur-
ity."' 53 Indeed, simple English can become complicated English.15 4
Jim Biery, lobbyist for the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association
and outspoken critic of the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act,
articulated a number of objections to Pennsylvania's proposed plain
language legislation. First, he maintained that a plain language law
would invite frivolous lawsuits by consumers. Second, he complained
that such a law would be expensive and contrary to the current der-
egulatory climate. Finally, he asserted that plain language legislation
is generally unsupported by the public. 55
In response to the first criticism, proponents of plain language
laws dismiss the threat of frivolous lawsuits and counter that fewer
disputes arise when contracts are straightforward. States that have
149. For examples of common words with uncommon meanings; old French, Middle En-
glish, Latin, and Anglo-Norman words; terms of art; argot; formal words; expressions with
flexible meanings; and mannerisms, which are frequently used (and abused) by lawyers, see D.
MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 11-29 (1963).
150. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 26.
151. See R. FLESCH, supra note 58, at 114.
152. When Citibank revised its loan note, for example, it provided the following defini-
tion of default:
Default. I'll be in default:
1. If I don't pay an installment on time; or
2. If any other creditor tries by legal process to take any money of mine in
your possession.
Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 29.
153. See Prather, supra note 134, at 396.
154. Id.
155. See Pittsburgh Press, supra note 8 (statements of Jim Biery).
enacted plain language laws have experienced very little litigation."5 6
For example, Gene Pasnantier, consumer affairs attorney with the
New Jersey Attorney General's Office, noted that only two cases and
one district attorney's action arose since New Jersey passed its plain
language law. One of these cases involved a questionable mortgage-
loan contract; the other concerned a lease agreement with a 197-
word sentence. The district attorney's action was directed against a
tree spraying business whose contract included a clause for continu-
ous service until the consumer furnished a written request for
discontinuance.57
In support of the second criticism, opponents of plain language
laws argue that one measure of the cost of such legislation for Penn-
sylvania would be the amount banks would have to spend to expand
their legal staffs to ensure that their documents comply. 15 8 Propo-
nents of plain language legislation answer that these costs would be
minimal because creditors in other states have already implemented
prototype contracts. 15 9
Plain language proponents also reverse the argument that plain
language laws are inappropriate in a deregulatory era. They claim
that plain language laws actually permit financial institutions to of-
fer more services to customers in a competitive environment. They
add that plain language laws promote direct communication between
creditors and borrowers and thus diminish the need for governmental
oversight.' 60
Responding to the alleged nonexistent demand for a plain lan-
guage law in Pennsylvania and to the question: "Where are the re-
sounding cries from the public that we pass a plain language stat-
ute?"' 1 , Lou Meyers, President of the Pennsylvania Citizens'
Consumer Council, answers that Pennsylvanians did not voice their
support for the Plain Language Consumer Contract Act because,
they were, to a large extent, uninformed about the bill. Myers be-
lieves that Pennsylvania's consumers would not have been apathetic
to the Act had it been brought to their attention. He designated fu-
ture passage of a plain language law for Pennsylvania as one of his
organization's top priorities.16 2 An additional reason for consumers'
silence might have been their inability to generate the cohesive co-
156. Hayes, Coping With the Plain English Law: A Lawyer's Bookshelf, 107 N.J.L.J.
115 (1981). This article provides a worthwhile summary of literature on the plain language
debate across the United States.
157. See Muddying Contracts, supra note 121.
158. See Pittsburgh Press, supra note 8.
159. See Muddying Contracts, supra note 121.
160. Id.
161. See Pittsburgh Press, supra note 8.
162. Telephone interview with Lou Meyers, President of the Pennsylvania Citizens' Con-
sumer Council (Sept. 25, 1984).
ordination, which characterized the bill's opponents.163 Finally, edi-
torials in the Philadelphia Inquirer,"6 4 the Pittsburgh Post-Ga-
zette, 65 and the Harrisburg Patriot-News6 supporting the Plain
Language Consumer Contract Act might stimulate public interest in
a future proposal.
An argument advanced by bankers is that plain language legis-
lation is particularly inappropriate for Pennsylvania because this
state is a large financial center." 7 This contention appears questiona-
ble when one considers that New York, New Jersey, and Connecti-
cut have plain language laws. Bankers also maintain that a plain
language law would cause Pennsylvania's financial forms to diverge
from the norm across the country and that this diversity might dis-
courage out-of-state parties from dealing with Pennsylvania's
financial institutions, making Pennsylvania a "financial island."1 8 It
is difficult, however, to conceive of Pennsylvania as a financial island.
Three plain language states-New York, New Jersey, and West Vir-
ginia-border Pennsylvania, and a fourth-Connecticut-is sepa-
rated from Pennsylvania by New York. The potential for conflicting
standards between plain language and nonplain language states and
among plain language states themselves has caused some commenta-
tors to suggest a uniform plain language statute at the federal
level.1
69
Pennsylvania retailers contend that there is less need for plain
language legislation in Pennsylvania because bordering states have
plain language laws. They reason that standard form contracts of
multi-state retailers already must comply with plain language re-
quirements of neighboring states and that smaller retailers buy their
contracts from printing houses which likewise must adhere to ex-
isting plain language laws. 7 ' Retailers also claim that current con-
sumer contract statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act,17' further
decrease the need for a plain language law in Pennsylvania.172 These
current laws, however, are aimed at disclosure, not at clear commu-
nication. They address the problem of what information must be
brought to consumers' attention, not whether a contract as a whole
must be written in plain English.
163. See Kukovich interview, supra note 6.
164. Pass the Plain-Language Bill, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 20, 1984, at 6.
165. See Muddying Contracts, supra note 121.
166. Brutto, Claptrap? Incontrovertibly Affirmative, The Sunday Patriot-News, Apr.
29, 1984, at 194.
167. See Rynd interview, supra note 130.
168. Id.
169. See Are They Working, supra note 16, at 148.
170. See Biacchi interview, supra note 147.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968).
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The existence of plain language guidelines17 and a regulation 74
governing the insurance industry in Pennsylvania has led insurers to
argue that they should not be covered by any plain language statute.
The Insurance Department issued the guidelines to assist insurers in
preparing and revising their forms. The Department expressed its in-
tention to use the guidelines in reviewing policy forms for approval.
These guidelines require short sentences, simple words, proper defini-
tions, and simple formats. They include suggestions on how to
achieve these goals, and they recommend implementation of the
Flesch Test.
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The regulation applies only to private passenger automobile in-
surance policies. It mandates short sentences, simple words, a limited
number of definitions, an index, an introduction, separation of cover-
ages, strict legibility requirements, section headings, incorporation of
conditions into applicable sections and a minimum Flesch Test score
of 40.171 In view of this regulation, insurers maintain that inclusion
under a plain language statute would expose them to a double stan-
dard of plain language requirements and would subject their con-
tracts to review by more than one state department. 77
The potential for contradictory standards is not as dire as insur-
ers claim because the plain language regulation applies only to pri-
vate passenger automobile policies. In addition, the regulation's re-
quirements are minimal. A document with a readability score of 40
requires a collegiate reading level and compares in difficulty to the
New York Times and the Harvard Business Review.' 78 Furthermore,
the Pennsylvania Legislature could solve the problem of multi-de-
partment review by giving the Insurance Department complete con-
trol over enforcement of plain language laws within the insurance
industry. The New Jersey Legislature chose this approach when it
modified its plain language law.' 79
Plain language advocates charge that insurance policies in
Pennsylvania are still not written in plain English because both in-
surers and the Insurance Department ignore the Department's
guidelines.1 80 In general, commentators have concluded that plain
language insurance laws throughout the country have been ineffec-
tive because insurers "are going through the motions but not making
any real progress." 18 When insurance contracts and mortgages were
173. 3 PA. ADMIN. BULL. 2937 (1973).
174. 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 64.1-.14 (Shepard's 1975).
175. 3 PA. ADMIN. BULL. 2937 (1973).
176. 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 61.1-.14 (Shepard's 1975).
177. See Kukovich interview, supra note 6.
178. See R. FLESCH, supra note 58, at 26.
179. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
180. Telephone interview with Atty. Jeff Friedman (Aug. 30, 1984).
181. See Are They Working, supra note 16, at 155.
eliminated from Pennsylvania's Plain Language Consumer Contract
Act,"'2 many observers concluded that the bill's effectiveness was
sharply reduced because those documents represent transactions in
which consumers can suffer significant harm.
183
Plain language critics have observed that legislators have not set
good examples in the plain language arena. The Sullivan Act, for
instance, sought clear language and forbade technical terms in con-
sumer contracts, but the Act employed phrases such as "meaningful
sequence," "party to a written agreement governed by the provisions
thereof, .... actual damages sustained," "court of competent jurisdic-
tion," and "render such agreement void or voidable." 18' Such incon-
sistencies between legislative aims and practices have stirred plain
language critics to call upon legislators to practice what they
preach.
8 5
C. Results of Plain Language Attempts
The best argument for enacting a plain language consumer con-
tract law in Pennsylvania is the experience of private businesses
which voluntarily implemented plain language standards' and of
states which embraced such standards through statutes. In the pri-
vate realm, companies which simplified their consumer contracts
have had much success. 8 7 In 1974, Sentry Insurance, then a rela-
tively small automobile insurance company, hired the polling firm of
Lou Harris & Associates and the Wharton School of Economics to
conduct a national opinion poll on policyholders' views concerning
automobile and homeowners policies. The consultants discovered
that consumers wanted their insurance policies written in plain En-
glish. Sentry responded with its "Plain Talk" automobile policy
which it marketed and advertised across the country. 8
Citibank's efforts to simplify its consumer loan forms proved ad-
vantageous for everyone involved. After conducting a survey of 101
individuals who had obtained a loan other than a mortgage from a
commercial bank, the Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn Re-
search Department found that the respondents favored Citibank's
new loan note over its old version because the former was compre-
hensible and precise. The respondents claimed that the old note was
difficult to read and understand, too lengthy, contained small print,
182. See H.R. 538 (1983) (Printer's No. 3157).
183. See Brown interview, supra note 118.
184. See Prather, supra note 134, at 397.
185. Id. at 399.
186. For a list of private businesses, including banks and insurance companies, which
voluntarily adopted plain language standards, see Hathaway, supra note 136, at 946.
187. See, e.g., Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 232.
188. Id. at 46.
and had a confusing format. Over half had no criticism of the new
loan note, while all expressed a strong dislike of the old version. 8 9
The study further disclosed that the respondents felt positively to-
ward a bank which used simplified forms and that they preferred to
do business with this type of bank. The lesson is obvious - consum-
ers prefer plain English documents. This discovery explains why
some businesses are voluntarily beginning to offer contracts written
in plain English. 9 '
Plain language laws have produced other worthwhile results.
Proponents cite three bases for their conclusion that plain language
laws have been effective. 9 ' First, the dire consequences predicted by
opponents never materialized. There has been no flood of litigation
or overwhelming hardship for creditors. Second, there has been no
mass effort to amend plain language laws, and proponents interpret
this as a sign that the laws are workable and useful. Finally, large
businesses and producers of legal forms have made progress in revis-
ing and simplifying their documents. Overall, plain language legisla-
tion has focused attention on the need for reform. It has provided a
necessary impetus to spur legal and business communities into action
and has compelled them to use ingenuity and common sense to
achieve goals envisioned by the plain language movement.' 92
Plain language laws, however, have not been a panacea.'93 Six
months after the Sullivan Act took effect in New York, the market-
ing research firm of Audits and Surveys conducted a study on the
Act's impact by interviewing over 200 retailers, commercial and sav-
ings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, finance com-
panies, and real estate firms. The survey found that the respondents
were not ignoring the law. Seventy-five percent had revised or were
revising their documents to comply with it. Banks and savings insti-
tutions headed the list, with over 90% of them implementing simpli-
189. Id. at 29.
190. Id. at 29-30. Carl Felsenfled, Vice-President of Citibank and a leading authority in
the plain language movement, described Citibank's change of loan forms as "without blem-
ish." See Pittsburgh Press, supra note 8. He commented, "We felt it was a desirable thing to
do for our customers. It was a basic sense of fair play that when people enter into something,
they should know about it." Id. Another advantage was that some of Citibank's own employees
read the forms for the first time. See id.
In Pennsylvania, Equibank of Pittsburgh has been attempting to simplify some of its con-
sumer contracts and application forms. Mike Kelly of Equibank's Media Relations Depart-
ment explained, "It is basically easier, not only for the customer to understand, but for us to
explain." Id.
191. See Are They Working, supra note 16, at 151.
192. Id. at 151-152.
193. After the Sullivan Act had been in effect for one year, the Executive Director of
the New York State Consumer Protection Board disclosed, "Leases, despite being revised since
the law took effect, are still couched in 'legalese' incomprehensible to most tenants." See
Block, Plain Language Laws: Promise v. Performance, 62 MICH. B.J. 950, 951 (1983). She
claimed that lawyers were "still attached to their 'hereunders' and 'thereofs' and seemingly
endless sentences." Id.
fled forms. On the other end of the list, only 36% of the real estate
firms had made any changes.""
Although the respondents were attempting to comply, the Sulli-
van Act was not achieving all of its intended goals. Seven out of ten
respondents said they would not have made any plain language revi-
sions without the law. This suggests that the main motivation was
compliance, not meaningful consumer communication. The respon-
dents' reflected their insouciance in the manner in which they re-
formed their documents. Although they sought less technical lan-
guage and shorter sentences and paragraphs, they virtually ignored
elimination of superfluous material, organization of information, vis-
ual elements, and use of active voice and personal pronouns. Many
respondents simply rephrased old forms into simpler language and
added captions. Thirty-two percent admitted that they were not
pleased with the results. 95
The lesson is that voluntary plain language attempts made by
private businesses are more effective than statutorily-motivated ef-
forts. Creditors who choose to change their contracts are genuinely
trying to communicate with consumers, and their forms are naturally
more readable and creative. '96 Any plain language endeavor in Penn-
sylvania must consider not only goals of plain language laws but also
experiences of other states and objections of bankers, retailers, real-
tors, and insurers. Whether Pennsylvania should enact a plain lan-
guage law depends on the type of plain language legislation
proposed.
IV. Suggestions for a Plain Language Law in Pennsylvania
Critics of the plain language movement do not claim that the
movement's goal is insignificant or that consumer contracts are with-
out communication problems. Plain language in the abstract is fre-
quently applauded. Opponents and even some proponents of the
movement, however, maintain that legislation is an inappropriate ve-
hicle to spur plain language reform. Inspired by Citibank's success in
voluntarily adopting a plain language policy, Carl Felsenfeld favors
voluntary plain language experiments. He echoes the concern of
many when he warns that plain language laws ultimately may re-
duce freedom and creativity. 97
Yet, results from other states demonstrate that although the ef-
fectiveness of plain language laws is limited, they do encourage plain
language in consumer contracts. Representative Kukovich remarked,
194. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 234.
195. Id. at 234-35.
196. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 235.
197. Id. at 232-33.
"Having any bill on the books is going to help the matter.' ' 198 Fel-
senfeld admitted, "In general, creditors, particularly the larger ones,
and form printers will attempt to comply with the law. However
grudging the efforts may be, contracts will improve. '  Thus, ex-
ploring an alternative between existing plain language laws and the
various versions of Pennsylvania's Plain Language Consumer Con-
tract Act on the one hand and no plain language law on the other
appears justified.
A. Subjective Standards Are Imperative for Non-Visual Elements
Any plain language law in Pennsylvania should rely on subjec-
tive instead of objective requirements. Subjective standards permit
flexibility in drafting legal documents, and comprehensive lists of
specific "guidelines" can supplement subjective standards to prevent
vagueness. Widespread use of the "reasonable man" standard in tort
law demonstrates that subjective standards are workable in the
law 200
Pennsylvania's experience with the Plain Language Consumer
Contract Act exposed difficulties inherent in imposing objective stan-
dards while attempting to retain the flexibility necessary for drafting
legal documents. The Kukovich proposal violated its own objective
standards in some places. 2°1 After several redrafts, Representative
Kukovich could finally state, "We proved that it could be done,
' 20 2
but he also proved that it can be a strenuous task.
In addition, objective readability tests provide only a limited
amount of guidance. The problem is that readability formulas, aside
from being awkward and tiresome, examine only word and sentence
length.203 They completely ignore content, grammar, cohesiveness,
interest level, and familiarity with the subject matter. In short, read-
ability formulas fail to measure comprehension which is the goal of
the plain language movement. 0 4 For example, "Write down your
first initial" and "Write down your gross income" have approxi-
mately the same readability score, but familiarity with more com-
plex concepts is required to understand the second phrase.20 5 "Write
down your pen" has the highest readability score of all three
phrases, indicating that readability formulas cannot distinguish be-
198. See Pittsburgh Press, supra note 8.
199. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 238.
200. Id. at 217.
201. See supra note 118 and text accompanying notes 95-131.
202. See Philadelphia Inquirer, supra note 119.
203. See Are They Working, supra note 16, at 157.
204. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 226-27.
205. Id. at 226.
tween sense and nonsense.2 °0 The information furnished by readabil-
ity formulas is very restricted, and the cost of applying readability
formulas in terms of time and effort often exceeds the value of any
increased comprehensibility.
B. Limit Penalties to Injunctive Relief
One way to forge an acceptable alternative may be to eliminate
many penalties often included in plain language laws. Severity of
penalties for noncompliance is a crucial factor in getting creditors
and legislators to accept a plain language prposal. Legislators have
been sensitized to the fact that for a large creditor utilizing standard
forms, potential liability for even minor violations could be
overwhelming.
20 7
Penalties typically included in plain language laws could be
eliminated without weakening the effectiveness of these laws. Statu-
tory damages and attorneys' fees, for example, seem extreme. Puni-
tive damages, the equivalent of statutory damages, are normally
awarded only to victims of outrageous acts. The American legal sys-
tem has traditionally looked with disfavor upon awards of attorneys'
fees, regardless of the financial positions of the plaintiff and
defendant.
Limiting enforcement provisions to injunctive relief"' would
achieve the aims of plain language legislation. A statute could ex-
pressly delegate to Pennsylvania's Attorney General and district at-
torneys power to seek injunctive relief to prevent use or enforcement
of contracts with plain language violations until those violations are
corrected. Such a provision would encourage creditors and printing
houses to review their standardized contracts. The Attorney General
and district attorneys could also seek injunctive relief against indi-
vidually tailored contracts containing gross violations, such as the
197-word sentence and continuing service clause in the New Jersey
examples.20 9
Keeping penalties mild by limiting enforcement provisions to in-
junctive relief would accomplish the goals of a plain language law
without making it a scythe to creditors. Legislators should not design
plain language laws to punish offenders; rather, they should frame
206. Id. at 227.
207. Id. at 228.
208. Extending a right to seek injunctive relief not only to public officials but also to
private citizens would not unfairly jeopardize creditors. Courts will not issue injunctions to
consumers who present flimsy claims. In addition, the Attorney General and district attorneys
may not possess the same motivation to act as consumers who face creditors enforcing ambigu-
ous contracts.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 122-189.
them as regulatory acts to stimulate contract reform.2"'
Because plain language standards are necessarily vague and
subjective, limiting penalties to injunctive relief would be appropri-
ate. Apprehension of violating 'subjective' standards would be more
modest if injunctions were the only penalty.21 Fears of bankers,
realtors, retailers, landlords, and other standardized-contract users of
costly penalties for breaking amorphous rules cannot be ignored;
212
creditors' fears of excessive penalties for violations of indefinite stan-
dards appeared to be the major cause of opposition to Pennsylvania's
Plain Language Consumer Contract Act. Enacting a plain language
statute which provides only for injunctive relief would evade many
political problems encountered by the Plain Language Consumer
Contract Act. By limiting penalties to nonmonetary relief, the Penn-
sylvania Legislature could increase the scope of its plain language
law and implement more comprehensive plain English guidelines.
Legislators should recognize that circumstances limit the guide-
lines which they can present in plain language laws. An exhaustive
list of plain language guidelines, if such is possible, could fill
volumes. To overcome many practical limitations on formulating
guidelines, it might be practical for the Pennsylvania Legislature to
delegate power to issue supplemental plain language guidelines to
the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Attorney General's Office.
Under the proposal to limit penalties for violations of plain lan-
guage laws to injunctive relief, the value of a review process headed
by the Bureau of Consumer Protection would not be diminished.
Such a review process would still provide a method for creditors to
obtain assurance that their contracts comply with plain language re-
quirements. In fact, creditors could also use the Bureau's plain lan-
guage certification for marketing purposes; they could advertise cer-
tified contracts as an extra advantage offered to their customers.
Finally, the Pennsylvania Legislature could authorize the Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection to disseminate information about plain
language contracts to both creditors and consumers. This informa-
tion would make it easier for creditors to revise their contracts and
would encourage good faith efforts exceeding minimum statutory re-
quirements. The information would also make consumers aware of
the benefits of plain language contracts and their rights under plain
language laws. Once consumers become familiar with the plain lan-
guage issue, they too can use it to their advantage in the
marketplace.
210. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 329.
211. See Writing Contracts, supra note 9, at 238.
212. See Legalities and Linguistics, supra note 11, at 333.
V. Conclusion
The upcoming session of the Pennsylvania Legislature should
enact a plain language law. The statute should be based on subjec-
tive standards, and penalties should be limited to injunctive relief.
Consumer advocates may argue that such a bill would be too weak.
This type of bill would, however, provide sufficient incentive to credi-
tors to comply with the statute's plain language standards. A
stronger measure would be too punitive considering the inherent dif-
ficulties in complying with plain language laws. Instead of encourag-
ing reform, a more forceful law would shackle contracting parties to
rigid, impractical, and unenforceable linguisitc rules. In light of
Pennsylvania's experience with the Plain Language Consumer Con-
tract Act, it is doubtful that a stronger measure would stand any
chance of passage. Limited penalties would also allow the Pennsylva-
nia Legislature to give its plain language law a broad scope of cover-
age and detailed plain language guidelines.
A plain language law based on subjective standards and limited
to injunctive relief for enforcement would satisfy all parties. It would
protect consumers from plain language violations in standardized
contracts and from gross violations in individual contracts and would
shield creditors from excessive liability. Such a law would be both
feasible and politically palatable. It is a rational alternative which
would begin to bridge the gap between the language of lawyers and
the language of laymen. This proposal calls for a mild measure be-
cause language usage can only be changed over many years, not in-
stantaneously. The Pennsylvania Legislature should enact a law
which seeks plain language through evolution, not revolution.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither
more nor less."
"The question is", said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
the master - that's all."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
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